Introduction
Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding,... William Nordhaus (2015 , p. 1339 To be effective, any international agreement that addresses climate change must address the absence of an international institution with the power to enforce compliance. Such agreements must be self-enforcing: the shadow of the future must give participants sufficient incentives to comply with the negotiated emission constraints.
Folk theorems suggest that, if countries are sufficiently patient, the first best outcome could be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in a repeated game of climate cooperation. For that, each country's benefit of sustained cooperation in future years needs to be sufficient to deter opportunistic behavior today. Unfortunately, as nearly 30 years of climate negotiations have shown, generating and sustaining cooperation is not easy. A look at the rules of the game might be in order.
An important challenge to the nearly thirty years of climate negotiations, which we address in this paper, has been that the joint gains from efficient climate cooperation are unequally distributed across countries. Without resource transfers, many countries would not agree to a globally efficient agreement, and only partial agreements or agreements with lower than efficient mitigation levels can be sustained. Hence, a second rule of the game we can change concerns resource transfers among countries.
Indeed, Fong and Surti (2009) show how side payments affect the optimal degree of cooperation in repeated prisoner's dilemmas. In the case of climate cooperation, resource transfers relax the emissions compliance constraint of recipient countries with low benefits or high costs from low emissions. Although the Paris Agreement allows for resource transfers, as did the Kyoto Protocol before it, the mechanisms to enable this have faced numerous -practical and conceptual -challenges and the actual resource flows and resulting additional mitigation have been limited.
For example, because a country's investment in compliance technology affects its costs and benefits from mitigation, its investment decisions need to be considered in the design of climate change agreements with resource transfers. Indeed, Harstad et al. (2019) (hereafter HLR) suggest to exploit the insight that a country's pay-offs from low or high emissions are critically dependent on its investments in compliance technology. HLR show that, where countries face too high costs or too low benefits to sustain efficient climate cooperation, second-best strategies to sustain low emissions in the repeated climate cooperation game overinvest in green and underinvest in brown or adaptation technologies. This change in the investment increases the benefit and lowers the cost of mitigation and thereby reduces the country's incentive to increase emissions. Therefore, a deeper understanding of the roles of timing of payments, green investment, and pre-commitment can help inform the development of more effective transfer mechanisms.
In this paper, we seek to understand which transfer mechanisms are able to most effectively expand the set of cooperating countries and the global level of mitigation.
We build on HLR's work and explore how to sustain higher levels of climate cooperation when not all countries have sufficiently high gains from low emissions to sustain HLR's second-best equilibrium. We start by carefully studying the conditions for existence of HLR's second-best equilibrium. We define the countries whose cooperation can be sustained in that equilibrium as members of a climate club. We then add the opportunity for countries to transfer resources to each other to HLR's basic setup and proceed to investigate the impact of transfers from members to countries that have a low net present value of benefits from participation and hence will not participate without support -defined as applicants to the club. We assume that if an applicant enters the club they will commit to the efficient level of emissions. 1 Initially, we build stylized models for three types of side payment agreements: upfront transfer agreements, where members transfer resources to applicants before they decide their investments and emissions; investment-based transfer agreements, where transfers to an applicant country occur contingent on having observed its investments but before it decides about its emissions; and results-based transfer agreements, where transfers occur after the applicant country's emissions have been observed. The Brazilian Amazon Fund, for example, "a REDD+ mechanism created to raise donations for non-reimbursable investments in efforts to prevent, monitor and combat deforestation, as well as to promote the preservation and sustainable use in the Brazilian Amazon," has elements of all these three types of transfer agreements. 2 For each agreement type, we study how the transfer needed to induce the efficient level of emissions depends on the recipient country's investment in compliance technology. In all three agreements, the applicant and member countries need to comply with investment and emissions levels, and members additionally need to comply with 1 One could consider partial cooperation and would obtain similar results. 2 See http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/home/. Two features of our model are crucial. First, emissions are typically observed with a lag, leading to the free-rider problem to start with, and second, some length of time normally elapses between an investment decision and the time at which the compliance technology is fully operational. These lags imply that the size of the transfer needed for compliance and the incentives for investment and abatement differ across our three agreements.
Our first result is that, for each applicant, there is an investment level that minimizes the transfer level it needs to receive to comply with low emissions, while for member countries, there is an investment level that maximizes the transfer level they are willing to make and still comply with low emissions. At these investment levels, countries overinvest in green technology by even more than in the second-best solution in Harstad et al. (2019) .
Next, we show that in all three types of agreements the levels of transfers and in-vestment that induce compliance of member countries with low emissions automatically also induce their compliance with the necessary investment and the transfers. Furthermore, in investment-based transfer agreements (only), the levels of transfers and investment that induce applicants to comply with low emissions also automatically induce their compliance with the necessary investment.
In contrast, the automatic compliance with the investment level can fail to hold for applicant countries in upfront and results-based transfer agreements. If, for example, the marginal cost of green investment is low for an applicant country, then the investment level that minimizes the transfer necessary to comply with low emissions will be very large. In that case, the country may defect by investing less than necessary in the first place, causing a defection in the emissions stage as well.
Absent the need to incentivize over-investment in green technology, all three types of agreements would have the same scope for climate cooperation. Therefore, when applicants that fulfil their emissions compliance constraints automatically also fulfil their investment compliance constraints, then all three schemes maximize that scope and policy-makers can choose either one of them to implement low emissions. In this case, member countries would want to choose a results-based agreement because it minimizes the overall transfer needed for compliance of an applicant country, whereas applicants would prefer an investment-based agreement, and the final choice of the agreement depends on the negotiations between countries.
In contrast, we find that, when applicants that fulfil the emissions compliance constraint would have an incentive to violate the investment constraint in upfront and results-based payment agreements, then investment-based agreements can implement low emissions when upfront and results-based payment agreements cannot.
In this case, low emissions could be achieved with higher overall transfers to the applicants than those necessary for compliance with low emissions only. This case, in which investment-based agreements implement more climate cooperation than results-based agreements, is empirically relevant. It applies to situations in which an applicant is small relative to the size of the world, has a low stock of green technology implying high gains from investing in green technology, has high costs for investment in green technology, and would be required to reduce emissions considerably.
We then introduce a credible third party, to which member countries transfer payments and which will give all the funds to the applicant if low emissions are observed. We only consider agreements with such a third party, which are upfront for member countries and results-based for applicants. We call them pre-commitment agreements. With pre-commitment agreements, the minimum payment applicants are willing to accept are of the size of results-based agreements, however, the maximum transfers member countries are willing to pay are as high as in upfront payment agreements. We find that, being able to implement cooperation with investment-based transfers implies being able to implement cooperation with pre-commitment agreements but not vice versa. Hence, if countries were able to pre-commit, they would both maximize the scope of climate cooperation with side payments and minimize the payments from member countries to applicants.
In an extension, we explore how the more realistic case of imperfect public monitoring of emissions affects our results. In this environment, we assume that only noisy, aggregate emissions are publicly observed and used to self-enforce low emissions. Both type I and type II errors are possible: countries may observe high emissions amd enter a punishment phase when all countries emitted less; and they may observe low emissions and not enter a punishment phase even though some countries emitted more. As can be expected, the scope for self-enforcing agreements implementing low emissions falls. This is reminiscent of Levin (2003) , which shows that, in labor markets, self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. However, the relative ability of up-front, investment-based, and results-based agreements to sustain low emissions, which we established with perfect monitoring, hold also in this environment. Further, with imperfect public monitoring, optimally sized transfers shorten equilibrium punishments phases and reduce the probability of their occurrence; and because the burden of transfers is shared among the member countries, having a higher number of them generally shortens punishment phases and reduces their likelihood.
We combine two strands of the literature on climate mitigation. First, by studying self-enforcing international environmental agreements, we add to a literature pioneered by Barrett (1994 Barrett ( , 2005 , Dutta and Radner (2004 , 2006 , Rubio and Ulph (2006), and McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) . 3 While these papers acknowledge that international agreements must be self-enforcing, they do not consider the role technology investments and financial transfers play in the sustainability of low emissions within such agreements. Building on Harstad (2012 Harstad ( , 2016 and Battaglini and Harstad (2016) , Harstad et al. (2019) integrate technology investments into a repeated games 3 This approach complements both the mechanism design approach to environmental agreements as, for example, in Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2016) , and the coalition formation approach as, for example, in Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006), de Zeeuw (2008) or Hong and Karp (2012) . 6 framework of climate cooperation. 4 They show that these investments are an integral part of second-best relational contracts because they affect the benefits from deviating from the agreement. We extend their approach by accounting for the possibility of side-payments between countries and show that, because investments take time to mature, the timing of side-payments matters for how much cooperation second-best agreements can achieve. Whereas Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Harstad et al. (2019) explicitly deal with both green and brown technologies, we concentrate on green technology.
Second, we add to a growing literature on international resource transfers in environmental agreements. This literature explains how financial transfers can be used to counter deforestation, and implicitly any other mitigation, with international emissions offset programs, as in van Benthem and Kerr (2013) , Pfaff et al. (2013), Lubowski and Rose (2013) , and Kerr (2013) , and to incentivize developing countries to participate in climate mitigation, as in Kerr and Millard-Ball (2012) . This approach to encourage climate cooperation complements the climate clubs and border carbon adjustments, as studied in Kosfeld et al. (2009) , Moore (2011) , Condon and Ignaciuk (2013) , Nordhaus (2015) , Kortum and Weisbach (2016) , or Sakai and Barrett (2016) .
Finally, in our modelling, we avoid the inefficiencies that can be introduced by contingent side-payments, as shown in Jackson and Wilkie (2005) , by restricting the set of actions in the emissions and investment game that these payments can be made contingent on. 5
2 The baseline HLR model
The stage game
Consider a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n ≥ 2 countries. Each country i ∈ N has a (population) size s i > 0. The aggregate size is normalized to n; that is, i∈N s i = n. The stage game consists of two sub-stages: the investment stage and the emission stage. At the former, countries i simultaneously decide their investment levels, r i ≥ 0, while, at the latter, all countries simultaneously choose to emit either more (g i ) or less (g i ) greenhouses gases, that is, g i ∈ {g i , g i } with g i < g i . Countries observe the actions of the previous 4 Other parts of that literature examine the effects of technology investments on a country's bargaining position in future climate negotiations, see for example Beccherle and Tirole (2011 ), or Harstad (2012 , 2016 ; or a country's incentives to invest when their investments benefit other negotiation partners, see for instance Barrett (2006) . 5 We thank Murali Agastya for pointing this out. 7 sub-stage before choosing the actions on the second sub-stage. The stage-game utility is given by
• b i is country i's per capita benefit function;
• h i j∈N s j g j specifies country i's (linear, with h i > 0) per capita cost of environmental damage due to aggregate emissions;
• k i is the marginal cost per unit of domestic investment.
To study self-enforcing climate agreements, HLR consider the case in which countries' emission decisions constitute a prisoner's dilemma:
These are the typical prisoner's dilemma assumptions. Part 1. states that, in the second sub-stage, it is individually rational to emit more; part 2. states that each country would be better off if neither country emitted more.
Define
Using Assumption 1, HLR show that the strategy profile (r * i (g i ), g i ) i∈N forms a unique SPE of the stage game and call it a business-as-usual (BAU) equilibrium, denoted by
HLR consider green, brown and adaptation technologies, that is, three ways in which investments and emissions translate into utility. We retain for our purposes green technology, which is defined as follows: 7
Definition 1. A technology is said to be green if b i (r i ) < 0.
HLR have shown that r * i ≡ r * i (g i ) > r b i for green technology and r * i < r b i for brown technology. 8
The repeated game
Let δ ∈ [0, 1) be a common discount factor for all countries and let countries care about the discounted flow of future pay-offs in the stage games. HLR consider an infinitely repeated game with discounting where the stage game described in Section 2.1 is played infinitely at every period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }, with the purpose of studying the conditions under which (r i , g i ) i∈N in each period can be sustained as an SPE. HLR define (r i , g i ) i∈N in each period as a best equilibrium. In addition, if r i = r * i ; i.e., each country i chooses the utility-maximizing investment level, then the SPE is called the first-best equilibrium.
In HLR's baseline model, countries are assumed to have perfect monitoring; that is, each of them can observe all actions chosen by their counterparts. 9 HLR show that a country is always guaranteed the payoff from the BAU equilibrium, which always exists, and so BAU is the worst possible SPE. Thus, to derive better equilibria, they can without loss of generality focus on a simple trigger strategy where deviationon or off the equilibrium path -immediately triggers infinite reversion to the BAU equilibrium. On the equilibrium path, deviations could be at the investment substage or at the emission sub-stage. To sustain (r i , g i ) i∈N as an SPE, each country i must have incentives to comply with the agreement. These incentive are summarized by two compliance constraints described below. 10 Fix i ∈ N and let
HLR also study adaptation technology, investing in which can lower the environmental damage from emissions and brown technology, investing in which is complementary to emissions.
8 To be precise, they show this for the case in which emissions levels g i and g i are symmetric across countries. The step to asymmetric emissions levels is straightforward. 9 HLR also consider an extension with imperfect monitoring, which we do not consider in this paper.
be the normalized (to one period) continuation value from complying with the SPE. 11
We will write v i (r i ) as v i whenever no confusion arises. Likewise,
is the continuation value of playing BAU equilibrium. It is worth noting that, by As-
The compliance constraint at the investment stage is
It is easy to see that the above inequality can be rewritten as v i ≥ v b i . Since the investment is sunk, the compliance constraint at the emission stage becomes
HLR show that if (CC i,g ) holds then so does (CC i,r ). Throughout the paper, we will
The left-hand side of the inequality represents country i's net discounted benefit from continuing to cooperate and the right-hand side its one-period net benefit from the extra emissions due to the deviation. To help with the analysis, we divide both sides by the difference of the two emissions levels
which is strictly increasing in δ. When δ is sufficiently close to 1, (CC i,g ) is fulfilled for some r i . We define
Because of Assumption 1, ψ i is positive for all r i ≥ 0. Note that ψ (r i ) = b i (r i ); therefore for green technology, ψ i is strictly decreasing in r i . Let δ i > 0 be the lowest value of δ such that (CC i,g ) holds. Let r i be the corresponding level of investment. Then, whenever δ < δ i , (CC i,g ) is violated for any r i . In addition, HLR define δ i as δ that
. 12 It follows that the first-best equilibrium is sustainable if δ > δ i for all i ∈ N . With δ i ≤ δ < δ i , country i is able to participate in the agreement but would not be able to invest at the level of r * i . Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the compliance constraint at the emissions stage, (CC i,g ). For green technology,
is a single-peaked curve with a maximum at r i = r * i , which intersects the horizontal axis at values of r i for which v i = v b i . As mentioned above, the function ψ i is downward-sloping for green technology. The left-hand-side panel depicts the situation where δ > δ i and, hence, country i's emissions compliance constraints hold for the first-best investment level r i = r * i . The right-hand-side panel depicts the situation where δ = δ i and, hence, country i's emissions compliance constraints just hold. For green technology, this implies a higher investment level than r * i .
Side payment models
Fix δ ∈ [0, 1). We assume that there exists at least one country i such that δ < δ i . That is, if the countries were interacting in the HLR repeated game, low emissions would not be sustainable in every period. Let M N be a subset of countries in which each
We will devise actions, which designate countries in M as member countries and countries in A as applicants. As defined in Section 2, all countries invest domestically;
but member countries, in addition, transfer side payments to applicants. Formally, let p ij be country i's per capita side payments to country j (the total side payments to country j is s i p ij ). Let p ij > 0 whenever i ∈ M and j ∈ A and let p ij = 0, otherwise.
Moreover, we let p ji = −s i p ij /s j . Following Fong and Surti (2009) , we assume that side payments enter country i's utility function linearly:
The superscript P distinguishes utility functions in side payment models from those in HLR. In what follows, we present four such models, which differ in the timing of the side payments.
Upfront Payment Agreements
Consider the case in which member countries agree to transfer side payments to applicants before they make investment and emissions decisions.
The stage game
The stage game has three sub-stages. In the first sub-stage, member countries transfer side payments to applicants. In sub-stage 2, countries decide their investment levels simultaneously. Countries determine their emissions at the last sub-stage. Following HLR, we assume that sub-stage 3 constitutes a prisoner's dilemma (Assumption 1).
In this model, there exists a unique SPE of the stage game such that member countries do not transfer any side payments and all countries play (g i , r b i ) i∈N . This SPE is tantamount to HLR's BAU equilibrium and, hence, it is assigned the same name.
Lemma 1. The stage game has a unique SPE such that p ij = 0, r i = r b i and g i = g i for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof. We prove this lemma by backward induction. Since stage 3 constitutes a prisoner's dilemma, every country chooses g i = g i . It follows that i would choose to invest at the level of r b i in stage 2. Now note that, for every i ∈ M,
therefore utility maximization gives a corner solution p ij = 0 for all j ∈ A.
The repeated game
Let the stage game described above be repeated infinitely. As a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the BAU equilibrium is sustainable in the repeated game. Furthermore, it is the worst SPE. To investigate how side payments can help sustain cooperation in emitting less greenhouse gases, we can, therefore, concentrate without loss of generality on designing an upfront payment agreement (hereafter UP agreement) where cooperation is self-enforcing when facing a threat of permanent reversion to the BAU equilibrium. This agreement corresponds to the following grim-trigger strategy.
Definition 2. A UP agreement is designed as follows:
1 (Side-payment stage). Each member country i ∈ M transfers side payments p ij to every applicant j ∈ A.
2 (Investment stage). All countries invest at the same time if they do not observe any deviation in Stage 1, otherwise they revert to the BAU equilibrium immediately and permanently.
3 (Emissions stage). All countries emit less if there is no deviation in both Stages 1 and 2, otherwise the BAU equilibrium is played forever.
We assume the emissions occur continuously but are observed at long intervals.
Investments take place at the beginning of the stage and are observed without delay; similarly transfers are observed without delay. To deal with discounting within the stage, we assume that (1) the benefit and environmental damage functions, b i (g i , r i ) and h i j∈N g j , represent the stage, per capita benefit and environmental costs, discounted to the beginning of the stage. We normalize the length of an emissions observations interval to 1.
Fix an applicant i ∈ A and let p i = j∈N s j s i p ji . Note that the continuation value of i is still v b i , as defined in Section 2, if all countries emit more. Then applicant i's 13 compliance constraint at the investment stage is
This can be simplified as
where v i is defined as in Section 2. At the emissions stage, the compliance constraint
is fulfilled only with a positive p i . Observe that a positive p i corresponds to a parallel upward shift of the curve
. It does not affect ψ i ; therefore there must be a level of p i > 0 such that (AC U i,g ) is satisfied. We find the minimum level of p i for which (AC U i,g ) holds resorting to the following minimization problem:
The following assumption, which we maintain throughout the paper, assures that the second-order condition of this minimization problem holds in the relevant range of r i .
A sufficient condition for Assumption 2 is that ψ i (r i ) ≥ 0. This means that the one-period payoff from cheating in the emissions substage is decreasing in r i , at a decreasing rate. If a country has already invested much in green technology, then investing in another unit of green technology will not reduce the benefit from cheating by much.
Let r i be the investment level such that the first-order condition ψ i (r i ) = γ i (δ) ∂v i ∂r i holds. Since the second-order condition
The investment level that minimizes the deficit in the applicant i's emissions compliance constraint, r i , always exists for green technology and r i > r * i . 13 It is important to note that
The following proposition shows that, for green technology, in that case it is possible to increase p i such that the applicant i complies with both of the constraints.
Proposition 1. For green technology there exists a unique pair ( r i , p i ) such that r i > r * i and both (AC U i,r ) and (AC U i,g ) hold with equality.
is strictly increasing and convex in r i when r i > r * i but ψ i (r i ) is strictly decreasing in r i , there exists a unique r i such that F( r i ) = 0. Let p i be the corresponding level of side payment. Hence the proof is complete.
wherep i is always the minimum possible level of side payment with which the applicant i can comply. Now fix a member country i ∈ M and let t i = j∈N p ij . Then i's compliance constraint at the side-payment stage is
which can be rewritten as
Then, similar to finding (AC U i,r ), the compliance constraint for the member country i at the investment stage is
Finally, the emissions compliance constraint is of the form
is the dual of (M), we use r i , without causing confusion, to denote the investment level that maximizes the net gains from cooperation in HLR's repeated game for the member country i. We let
and call e i the maximum (per capita) slack in member country i's emissions compliance constraint. 14 To incorporate side payments, we extend HLR's definition of a best equilibrium in the following way.
Definition 3. An SPE is said to be a best equilibrium if, at every period, it satisfies g i = g i for all i ∈ N and the minimum possible amount of side payments to the applicants are implemented.
Since the definition requires every applicant i to invest at the level ofr i > r * i , HLR's first-best equilibrium is not of our interest. 15 An SPE is called a best equilibrium rather than the best equilibrium because there might be different sharing rules of side payments among member countries. Our definition extends HLR's definition if δ ≥ δ i for all i ∈ N , in which the minimum amount of side payments necessary to sustain a best equilibrium is zero.
For the total amount of side-payment transfer, budget balance gives that i∈M s i t i = i∈A s ipi . Then if member countries have enough slack in emissions compliance constraints, an UP agreement which specifies (r i ) i∈A will be a best equilibrium.
Lemma 2. If i∈M s i e i ≥ i∈A γ i (δ)s ipi , then an UP agreement corresponds to a best equilibrium.
The maximum aggregate slack in the member countries' emissions compliance constraints, i∈M e i , is achieved if every member i ∈ M invests at r i = r i . If i∈M e i > γ i (δ) i∈Api , then this implies too large a sacrifice for the member countries and (many) best equilibria can be found. Because, in this paper, we are interested in whether best equilibria exist in the various climate agreements with transfers we concentrate on agreements that require the slack-maximizing investment by member countries.
Investment-based Agreements
Consider the case in which member countries agree to transfer side payments to applicants after they observe the applicants' investment decisions.
The stage game
Similar to the one in Section 3.1, the stage game has three sub-stages. In the first sub-stage, applicants make investment decisions. Member countries decide their investment levels and transfer side payments simultaneously in the second sub-stage. In the last sub-stage, countries determine whether to emit more or emit less. We assume that the last sub-stage follows Assumption 1. In this stage game, there exists a unique BAU equilibrium. The proof is analogous to the one for Lemma 1 and hence ignored.
Lemma 3. The stage game has a unique SPE such that p ij = 0, r i = r b i and g i = g i for all i, j ∈ N .
The repeated game
The repeated game is defined as an infinite repetition of the stage game described in Section 3.2.1. Again, as a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the BAU equilibrium is sustainable in the repeated game. Furthermore, it is the worst SPE. Hence, we again concentrate without loss of generality on designing an investment-based (IB) agreement where cooperation is self-enforcing when facing a threat of permanent reversion to the BAU equilibrium. This agreement corresponds to the following grim-trigger strategy.
Definition 4. An IB agreement is defined as follows: 1 (Investment stage for applicants). Each applicant i ∈ A invests at the level of r i . 16 2 (Investment and side-payment stage for member countries). Member countries invest at the levels of ( r i ) i∈M and transfer side payments simultaneously if they do not observe any deviation in Stage 1, otherwise they switch to the BAU equilibrium immediately. 17 3 (Emissions stage) All countries emit less if no deviation is observed in both Stages 1 and 2, otherwise countries play permanently the BAU equilibrium.
Fix an applicant i ∈ A. Let us first suppose that i is required to invest r i . Recall that p i = j∈N p ji . Then i's compliance constraint in Stage 1 is the following:
Because in sub-stage 3 r i and p i are sunk, i's emissions compliance constraint becomes
Since ψ i is always positive, (AC I i,g ) implies (AC I i,r ). We can observe that (AC I i,g ) has the same form of (AC U i,g ). So, for green technology, it follows from (M) that r i minimizes the side payment needed to fulfill (AC I i,g ) and that this level is given by p i . Let i ∈ M. If there is no applicant deviating in the first stage, then the member
as the compliance constraint for the investment and side-payment stage. When (MC I i,rt ) holds, we can write the compliance constraint at the emissions stage as
As we have seen, member countries have the maximum level of slackness when investing at ( r i ) i∈N . Therefore, analogous to Lemma 2, if member countries have sufficient slack in their emissions compliance constraints, then an IB agreement constitutes a best equilibrium.
Lemma 4. If i∈M s i e i ≥ γ i (δ) i∈A s i p i , then an IB agreement forms a best equilibrium.
Results-based Agreements
We now consider RB agreements. Here, countries transfer side payments to applicants after they observe the applicants' emissions. Because emissions are observed only in the end of the period, the transfer is to be discounted within the period.
The stage game
The stage game here has three sub-stages. Countries make domestic investment decisions simultaneously in the first sub-stage. They choose their emissions in the second sub-stage. As before, the emissions sub-stage follows Assumption 1. In the last substage, member countries transfer side payments to applicants. Once again, this stage game has a unique BAU equilibrium as follows.
Lemma 5. The stage game has a unique SPE such that p ij = 0, r i = r b i and g i = g i for all i, j ∈ N .
The repeated game
We define the RB agreements as follows.
Definition 5. An RB agreement is such that: 1 (Investment stage). Each applicant i invests atr i for all i ∈ A and each member country i invests at r i for all i ∈ M. 
(Emissions stage). All countries emit less if no country deviates in
respectively. We can see that (AC R i,g ) does not imply (AC R i,r ) directly. According to (M), the minimum level of side payments needed for (AC R i,g ) to hold with equality is p i . If p i does not satisfy (AC R i,r ), then we have to consider i investing at r i such that both (AC R i,r ) and (AC R i,g ) hold with equality. This r i is the same as r i defined in Section 3.1. Now fix i ∈ M. The compliance constraint at the investment stage is the same as
In the emissions sub-stage, investment is sunk. Hence, the emissions compliance constraint becomes
Note that (MC R i,g ) implies (MC R i,r ) because δ ∈ (0, 1). In the side-payment stage, the member country i has the compliance constraint
which is implied by (MC R i,g ) and implies (MC R i,r ). By budget balance, sufficient slack in member countries' emissions compliance constraint corresponds to
Thus, by the same conditions as in Lemma 2, an RB agreement serves as a best equilibrium.
Lemma 6. If i∈M s i e i ≥ i∈A γ i (δ)s ipi , then an RB agreement constitutes a best equilibrium. Figure 3 illustrates the two constraints for upfront-transfer and results-based agreements. Each panel graphs the transfer necessary to satisfy the emissions compliance
Illustration
i ), and the transfer necessary to satisfy the investment compliance constraint, (v b i − v i (r i ))/δ, both as functions of the investment level. Transfers on and above the curves ensure compliance, whereas transfers below it do not. The transfer necessary to satisfy compliance at the investment stage is minimized at r * i , whereas the one ensuring compliance at the emissions stage is minimized at r i . The case, in which investment-based transfer agreements implement cooperation when upfront transfer and results-based agreements cannot is depicted in the panel on the right. Here, at the investment level that minimizes the transfer needed to ensure the emissions compliance constraint holds, the investment compliance constraint is violated for upfront-transfer and results-based agreements, but it would not be violated for investment-based agreements.
We can find conditions for which investment-based agreements implement cooperation when upfront-payment or results-based agreements do not by inspecting the 
The left-hand side of the inequality 18 corresponds to the extra benefit from deviating at the investment stage as compared to deviating at the emissions stage. This is a positive number. The right-hand side corresponds to the cost of the environmental damage from deviating at the investment stage rather than deviating at the emissions stage. Also this is a positive number. An applicant deviates by under-investing if the extra benefit from deviating at the investment stage as compared to deviating at the emissions stage is larger than the extra cost of environmental damage from doing so.
Let us examine the determinants of under-investing. We begin by studying the impact of the marginal cost of green investment. An increase in the marginal cost of green investment, k i , has two effects, both on the extra benefit from deviating at the 18 We derive inequality (1) in the appendix.
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investment stage as compared to deviating at the emissions stage, that is, the left-hand side of inequality (1).
First, it increases the weight put on the strictly negative difference r b i − r i , which decreases the left-hand side of the inequality. Second, it decreases r i , which decreases the extra benefit from deviating at the investment stage rather than at the emissions stage, and further decreases the left-hand side of the inequality. Hence, lowering the marginal cost of green investment means the transfer-minimizing investment level, r i , increases by so much that the country may defect in the investment stage and an applicant country is less likely to satisfy the investment compliance constraint with r i .
Holding fixed j∈N = n, an increase in a country's size relative to the rest of the world, s i , has no impact on either r i or r b i and, hence, it does not affect the left-hand side of inequality (1). However, it decreases the extra-environmental cost from deviating at the investment stage as compared to deviating at the emissions stage, that is, the right-hand side of inequality (1). Hence, a higher s i means a country is more likely to satisfy the investment compliance constraint with r i . An increase in the marginal environmental damage, h i , again has no impact on either r i or r b i and, hence, it does not affect the left-hand side of inequality (1). It increases the extra-environmental cost from deviating at the investment stage as compared to deviating at the emissions stage, that is, the right-hand side of inequality (1). Hence, a higher h i means a country is less likely to satisfy the investment compliance constraint with r i . Interestingly, the discount rate has no impact on whether a country that fulfils the emissions compliance constraint is likely to violate the investment compliance constraint.
To illustrate the conditions under which investment-based agreements implement low emissions and results-based agreements do not, we assume
where w i and z i are parameters. It is easy to verify that this benefit function satisfies the condition for green technology.
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Using this functional form, we compute the BAU investment level for country i:
Further, we compute the emissions compliance constraint deficit-minimizing investment level for recipient country i:
Assumption 3. Let there be one applicant country, i, and n − 1 member countries. Let
Then, (1) becomes
In Figures 4 and 5 1.5] in Figure 4 and w ∈ [.5, 10] in Figure 5 . We see that investment-based agreements implement low emissions when results-based and upfront-payment agreements do not if (i) country i is small relative to the size of the world, (ii) the emissions reduction required, g i − g i (or ∆ i ), is large, (iii) country i's idiosyncratic per capita cost of environmental damage due to aggregate emissions, h i , is large, (iv) country i's unit cost of investment, k i , is small for green technology, and (v) country i's benefit function reacts strongly to increases green investment technology investments. All three agreements sustain best equilibria if all applicant countries' investment compliance constraints are slack instead.
Pre-commitment Agreements
So far, we have only considered agreements that do not require a third party that can credibly hold on to payments from member countries and pass them on to applicants 19 Under the assumption that such a third party exists, we can consider pre-commitment (PC) agreements, where member countries transfer upfront payments to a credible third party, who will give all the funds to the applicant if low emissions are observed.
The stage game
The stage game has three sub-stages. In the first sub-stage, member countries transfer side payments to a credible third party. In sub-stage 2, countries decide their investment levels simultaneously. Countries determine their emissions at the last sub-stage.
We assume that stage 3 constitutes a prisoner's dilemma (Assumption 1). Any applicant who has made low emissions will receive side payments from the third party.
Once again, this stage game has a unique BAU equilibrium as follows.
Lemma 7. The stage game has a unique SPE such that p ij = 0, r i = r b i and g i = g i for all i, j ∈ N .
The repeated game
We define the PC agreements as follows.
Definition 6. A PC agreement is such that: 1 (Side-payment stage). Each member country i ∈ M transfers the agreed levels of side payments to a credible third party.
2 (Investment stage). Each applicant i invests atr i for all i ∈ A and each member country i invests at r i for all i ∈ M if there is no deviation in Stage 1.
(Emissions stage). All countries emit less if no country deviates in both Stage 1
and Stage 2, otherwise they play the BAU equilibrium immediately. Applicants receive side payments after making low emissions.
A PC agreement is equivalent to the case that the member signs an UP agreement but the applicant signs an RB agreement. Therefore, for any applicant i ∈ A, its compliance constraints at Stages 1 and 2 are
and
Once again, (AC C i,g ) does not imply (AC C i,r ). Similarly, for a member country i ∈ M, its compliance constraints at Stages 1, 2 and
Note that (MC C i,g ) implies both (MC C i,t ) and (MC C i,r ). These constraints take into account that the third party only pays out to the applicants in the end of the period and, hence, discounts as members and applicants would.
Analogous to Lemmas 2, 4 and 6, we find the following condition for the existence of a PC agreement as a best equilibrium.
Lemma 8. If i∈M s i e i ≥ i∈A γ i (δ)s i (δp i ), then a PC agreement forms a best equilibrium.
Results
In the following propositions, we summarize common features shared by the agreements and the relationship among them.
Proposition 2 (Side payment-minimizing investments).
1. If it exists, each applicant i' emissions-constraint deficit-minimizing investment, r i , is the same in all four agreements. Furthermore, (a) r i > r * i for green technology, and (b) r i < r * i for brown technology.
2. The side payment-minimizing investment for each applicant i, r i , whenever r i does not work, is the same across UP, RB and PC agreements. Furthermore, (a) r i > r i > r * i for green technology, and (b) r i < r i < r * i for brown technology.
Proposition 3 (Size of side payments to applicants). UP agreements need the biggest size of side payment, IB agreements the second-biggest, and PC and RB agreements the smallest.
Proof. Follows directly from the text.
We next present the relationship among all four agreements. In terms of implementability, RB and UP agreements are the least implementable, IB agreement the second-least, and PC agreement the most.
Proposition 4 (Relationship among best equilibria).
1. An RB agreement is a best equilibrium if and only if a UP agreement is a best equilibrium.
2. If an RB agreement (or a UP agreement) is a best equilibrium, then there exists an IB agreement which is a best equilibrium, but not vice versa.
3. If an RB agreement (or a UP agreement) is a best equilibrium, then there exists a PC agreement which is a best equilibrium, but not vice versa.
4. If an IB agreement is a best equilibrium, then there exists a PC agreement which is a best equilibrium, but not vice versa.
Extension: Imperfect Public Monitoring
Assume that investment and transfer decisions are perfectly observable, whereas emissions cannot be observed perfectly. As in HLR, let aggregate emissions, be given by
where player g 0 are nature's emissions, drawn from the cdf F(·) and i.i.d. over time.
Country-specific emissions levels are not observable and instead, all countries observe g at the end of each period. For simplicity, we concentrate on the case of green technology in this section.
As HLR, we restrict ourselves to public perfect equilibria. The best PPE (r, g) is be sustained by the following class of grim-trigger strategies: Comply by transferring t,
investing r, and emitting g as long as (i) no country deviated in the investment stage and (ii) the observed aggregate pollution level is below a threshold, that is, g ≤ g, for some threshold in every earlier period. If countries observe g > g, they play BAU for T ≤ ∞ periods before returning to the PPE. If a country deviates in the transfer stage or the investment stage, countries play BAU forever after.
Denote by q ≡ 1 − F( g − ng) the probability that aggregate emissions exceed the threshold g despite low emissions by every country and by 1 − p ≡ F( g − (g + (n − 1)g)) the probability that aggregate emissions do not exceed the threshold despite the cheating of one country. Note: p > q.
To simplify the analysis in this subsection, assume the following holds throughout this section.
Assumption 4. There are n − 1 homogeneous member countries and one applicant country. Further, s i = 1.
As in HLR, there are two cases to consider: the one in which a finite punishment suffices for cooperation to be sustainable and the one in which an infinite duration of the punishment is necessary. However, given the applicant country would not comply without a transfer, the optimal length will be infinite.
Upfront payment agreements 4.1.1 Applicants
The applicants' objective function is
At the investment stage, the transfer is sunk. Hence, the investment compliance constraint is given by
At the emissions stage, both the transfer and the investment are sunk. Hence, the emissions compliance constraint is given by
or shorter
Finally, the continuation values ω i (r i ) and ω i (r i ) need to satisfy
In the best equilibrium, it is clear that ω i (r i ) must be as large as the emissions compliance constraint (4) permits and ω i (r i ) = u i (r i ). This implies
Substituting (7) into (2) gives
Substituting (8) and (6) into (7), we get the following expression for the emissions compliance constraint of an applicant country
Note: u b i = v b i is the BAU payoff for the applicant country. Further, as before, denote v i (r i ) = b i (g, r i )−h i ng −k i r i . Then, we can rewrite this expression as the applicant country's emissions compliance constraint with imperfect public monitoring,
Substituting (8) and (6) into (3) gives
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We can rewrite this as the applicant country's investment compliance constraint with imperfect public monitoring,
), it can be seen that -as in the perfect monitoring case -satisfying the emissions compliance does not imply satisfying the investment compliance constraint.
As in the perfect monitoring case, we assume γ(δ)
Hence, the emissions compliance constraint is fulfilled only with a positive p i .
As with perfect monitoring, p i does not affect ψ i . Hence there must be a level p i > 0
denote the investment level that minimizes the transfer to applicant country i necessary for its emissions compliance constraint to hold. Under Assumption 2, the secondorder condition of this minimization problem holds in the relevant range or r i .
Comparing this minimization program to that from the perfect monitoring case, we conclude that the transfer minimizing investment level with imperfect monitoring exceeds that with perfect monitoring: r IP M i > r i . 
wherep IP M i is always the minimum possible level of side payment with which the applicant i can comply.
Members
Following the steps from the Applicants' section, we can find the following constraints for member countries with an upfront payments agreement:
Define, as before, the maximum slack per capita in member country i's emissions compliance constraint by The applicants' objective function is
At the investment stage, nothing is sunk. Hence, the investment compliance constraint is given by
Following the steps from the upfront payments agreement section, we find an applicant country's emissions compliance constraint,
as well as its investment compliance constraint, 
Following these steps, we find the following constraints for member countries with an investment-based payments agreement: The applicants' objective function is
At the investment stage, nothing is sunk. So the investment compliance constraint is given by
At the emissions stage, the investment is sunk, but the transfer is not. Hence, the emissions compliance constraint is given by (17) Finally, the continuation values ω i (r i ) and ω i (r i ) need to satisfy
Again, following the steps from the upfront payments agreement section, we find the emissions compliance constraint of an applicant country,
and its investment compliance constraint, 
Similarly, we find the following constraints for member countries with an resultsbased payments agreement: 
Results
The previous section shows that the -realistic -case of imperfect public monitoring does not alter the insights from the full information environment. Upfront payments and results-based payments agreements implement low emissions for the same parameter values. Whenever results-based payment agreements implement low emissions, they will be preferred by member countries because they imply the lowest transfers. However, there are instances, in which investment-based agreements implement low emissions when results-based agreements do not. These instances are empirically relevant, as the next section will demonstrate.
Transfers, imperfect public monitoring and equilibrium path punishments
The previous subsections showed that, with imperfect public monitoring, the insights on the relative scopes of implementing low emissions with our three basic transfer agreements, which we gained in the perfect monitoring environment, continue to hold. Countries maximize the scope for implementing low emissions with investmentbased agreements.
Note that the applicant country's emissions compliance constraint can be relaxed with a higher transfer, p i . This implies countries can implement low emissions with less likely equilibrium punishments by increasing transfers to a recipient country, for which the emissions compliance constraint binds at T → +∞. Given punishments take place on the equilibrium path, this may well be optimal for member countries.
To simplify the exposition of this point, in this subsection, we assume that countries agree on investment-based transfers. As we saw earlier, this implies we only need to take care of the emissions compliance constraints.
Assumption 5. Countries agree on investment-based transfers.
Assuming the member countries' emissions compliance constraint has sufficient slack, the relevant emissions compliance constraint is the one of the applicant country, i ∈ A, which can be written as:
Denote global emissions by g ≡ g 0 + i∈N g i , where g 0 ∼ N (0, 1). The best equilibrium specifies a threshold g(p i ), above which the countries enter a punishment phase.
The punishment phase is triggered by mistake if g 0 > g(p i ) − ng. Therefore, it is beneficial to raise the threshold g(p i ) as far as possible. For that, T or p i needs to be raised for the emissions compliance constraint to be satisfied.
Lemma 12 (HLR). There exists a unique threshold g(p i ), such that, in the best equilibrium, continuation values of the applicant country i ∈ A are given by
Given this threshold, in equilibrium, type I errors occur with probability q = 1 − Φ g(p i ) − ng and type II errors occur with probability 1 − p = Φ g(p i ) − (n − 1)g − g .
The member countries can further reduce the probability of (erroneous) punishment on the equilibrium path, q, by increasing g(p i ). To do so, they need to decrease the applicant country's temptation to defect. They can do so by increasing p i . For each i ∈ N , it supports g i,t = g, r i,t = r b i , and p i = 0 if g i,τ > g(p i ) for some τ < t. Otherwise, for each i ∈ N , g i,t = g, and for each a ∈ A and m ∈ M, r a,t = r a > r * ; and Hence, side payments to applicant countries not only relax the applicant countries' investment and emissions constraints; their size also determines the optimal probability of entering a punishment phase on the equilibrium path. The optimality condition in Proposition 5 shows that this optimal probability of punishment on the equilibrium path depends negatively on the number of member countries.
Discussion
We observe the following for agreements that do not use a third party. To start with, the conditions for an equilibrium with low emissions in each period (a best equilibrium) to exist with upfront payments and results-based agreements are the same, so a best equilibrium with upfront payment agreements exists if and only if there is a best equilibrium with results-based agreements. However, the payment necessary to induce compliance of an applicant country, both in the investment and the emissions stages, is higher with upfront than with results-based payments. Hence, upfront payment agreements are dominated in our framework.
Next, it is possible to satisfy the emissions compliance constraints of best equilibria for all member and applicant countries with upfront payments and results-based agreements if and only if it is possible to do so with investment-based agreements. However, in contrast to under an investment-based agreement, under upfront or resultsbased agreements satisfying the emissions compliance constraint does not imply that the investment compliance constraint is also satisfied. Hence, if best equilibria exist with upfront payment and results-based agreements, then they also exist with investmentbased agreements, but not vice versa. When the investment compliance constraint of an applicant country is binding, then with upfront payment and results-based agreements, these equilibria require higher discount factors than with investment-based agreements. We find that these results are robust to more realistic informational environments where it is not possible to perfectly monitor a country's emissions.
We find that investment-based agreements implement low emissions when resultsbased and upfront-payment agreements do not if (i) country i is small relative to the size of the world, (ii) the emissions reduction required is large, (iii) country i's idiosyncratic per capita cost of environmental damage due to aggregate emissions is large, (iv) country i's unit cost of investment is large for green technology, and (v) country i's benefit function reacts strongly to increases green investment technology investments. All three agreements sustain best equilibria if all applicant countries' investment compliance constraints are slack instead.
If countries can use a credible third party to pre-commit to an agreement that treats the member countries as an upfront payments agreement would and the applicant countries as a results-based agreement would, we find the following additional results. If best equilibria with upfront payment and results-based agreements exist, then they also exist with pre-commitment agreements, but not vice versa. Best equilibria with upfront payment and results-based agreements and no pre-commitment are always harder to sustain than best equilibria with pre-commitment agreements because the latter combines the advantages of both of the former: member countries cannot renege ex-post on the transfers and applicant countries can renege ex-post on emissions. This implies a high willingness to pay on part of the member countries and a low willingness 37 to accept on part of the applicants. In spite of requiring additional incentives to invest at the transfer-minimizing level on part of the applicant countries, best equilibria with pre-commitment agreements always exist when they exist with investment-based agreements, but not vice versa. Also, member countries will prefer pre-commitment to investment-based agreements because they require lower transfers to achieve the same low emissions.
Such a credible third party is essentially an international institution with something close to the power to ensure compliance. Member countries would like to precommit to such an institution. However, there will likely be institutional limits to their ability to do so. Beyond these limits, member countries need to trade off between the scope of cooperation, which is the highest with an investment-based agreement, and the size of the payment, which is the lowest with a results-based agreement. Then, in empirically relevant situations, in which results-based agreements do not provide sufficient incentives to invest in green technology, investment-based payment agreements may. It is worth giving them a look.
A Proofs and derivations
Derivation of inequality (1)
We violate the investment compliance constraint if
).
Proof of Lemma 12. We reproduce the proof of the comparable Lemma from Harstad
